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M. Kathleen Kern, Editor
When Eric Phetteplace asked me if browser privacy would be 
an appropriate topic for the Accidental Technologist column, 
I asked how soon he could write it. Even though he graduated 
in May 2011 and moved to start a new job, he presented me 
with the column this fall. In “Hardening the Browser,” Eric 
poses some questions for consideration about how involved 
libraries should be in training our patrons on Internet pri-
vacy. He also provides a lot of practical how-to information 
that will be useful for your library and for your personal web 
browsing.—Editor
A rticle 3 of the current Code of Ethics of the Ameri-can Library Association states that “[ALA mem-bers] protect each library user’s right to privacy and confidentiality with respect to information sought 
or received and resources consulted, borrowed, acquired or 
transmitted.” This noble maxim has led many librarians to be 
advocates for the right to privacy, even to the point of resisting 
federal legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act. However, 
merely protecting a patron’s circulation records has become 
but a small hillock of the privacy terrain in our modern infor-
mation environment. As more and more time is spent access-
ing and producing content online, libraries need to position 
themselves to offer Internet privacy to patrons as well.
The much-publicized “Firesheep” add-on for Mozilla 
Firefox highlights the need for education surrounding privacy 
on the Internet.1 While traffic sent over HTTP on a public 
wireless network has always been vulnerable, Firesheep 
makes stealing others’ log-in credentials a trivial procedure. 
Simply open Firefox, click a button to start capturing log-in 
credentials from others on the same public network, and soon 
you can post to their social media accounts, such as Face-
book. While Firesheep runs only on Firefox, it can exploit 
unprotected users in any other browser. The add-on is not in 
Mozilla’s official directory of enhancements for Firefox and 
it was created as a proof of concept, meant to highlight vul-
nerabilities that already exist and not to create further ones. 
However, there also is nothing to stop malicious users from 
employing Firesheep to their own ends.
While discussions around Firesheep typically note that 
public Wi-Fi hot spots occur in coffee shops or airports, many 
libraries also provide wireless networks. As of 2010, 85.7 
percent of public libraries offered wireless Internet access, 
and another 5.9 percent planned to make wireless connec-
tions available within a year.2 As such, it is the responsibility 
of librarians to educate users of the risks and insulate them 
against potential attackers. While not all librarians are able to 
secure their institution’s networks or even choose the software 
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settings on their public computers, simply spreading aware-
ness of online privacy problems and potential solutions is a 
major step forward in an increasingly important area of in-
formation literacy. This column will detail three layers where 
protections can be implemented: in the choice of an Internet 
browser, the user settings within the software, and, finally, 
add-ons that extend the browser’s functionality, providing 
additional security beyond the default architecture.
CHoosinG tHE RiGHt BRowsER
The easiest defense is at the level of the Internet browser 
itself. Selecting software that has historically proven to be 
secure, such as Mozilla Firefox or Google Chrome, immedi-
ately places your users in a safer arena. On the other hand, 
Internet Explorer is a notoriously insecure piece of software, 
and Apple’s Safari browser has proven to be similarly vulner-
able. Both browsers were hacked on the first day of the 2011 
“Pwn2Own” event at the CanSecWest computer security 
conference, while no participants even attempted to hack 
Firefox and Chrome.3 It should not have to be mentioned, 
but Internet Explorer 6 still holds a modicum of marketshare 
in the United States and is regarded by some as the most in-
secure piece of software ever developed.4 Part of the reason 
for this is the ActiveX Controls that interactive websites can 
use in Internet Explorer. These controls run with the same 
level privileges as the user running the program, which gives 
malware opportunities to interact with many elements of the 
Windows operating system, including downloading files and 
executing programs. If your library or any of your users are 
still using Internet Explorer 6, migration to a newer version is 
absolutely essential. It speaks volumes that Microsoft itself has 
an Internet Explorer 6 Countdown site that advises “friends 
don’t let friends use Internet Explorer 6,” yet that same site 
shows 1.4 percent market share in the United States as of 
September 30, 2011.5
On the other hand, Google Chrome has developed a few 
innovative approaches to security.6 First of all, plug-ins such 
as Shockwave Flash are often a source of security vulnerabili-
ties, which is further exacerbated by users failing to update 
to the latest versions when they become available. To address 
this issue, Chrome packages plug-ins along with its own 
automatic updates that run seamlessly in the background, 
never providing the user an opportunity to opt-out of valu-
able security patches. Especially for large, public computing 
labs not running virtualized software, automatic updates save 
IT staff time and reduce user confusion. Second, Chrome 
“sandboxes” plug-ins so that even when vulnerabilities are 
exploited, they cannot break into the larger operating system 
environment. Thus problems analogous to malicious Ac-
tiveX Controls with too great of privileges are circumvented. 
Finally, Chrome also works to inform users of site security, 
from highlighting the “https” prefix in green font beside a 
safety lock to warning when users are about to visit a mali-
cious website.
It is worth noting that Google’s branded version of the 
Chromium open-source project automatically reports cer-
tain information back to the Mountain View-based company, 
including crash reports, mistyped URLs, the location where 
Chrome was downloaded, and anything typed into the ad-
dress bar (or “omnibar” in Chromium-speak). These track-
ing activities could be circumvented by using SRWare Iron, a 
fork of the Chromium project that is more or less identical to 
Chrome but with the Google reporting stripped out and a few 
additional privacy measures added in. However, Iron does not 
yet include Chromium’s automatic updating mechanism and 
thus may pose ulterior problems beyond Google’s monitoring.
Before Chrome was released to the public in Decem-
ber 2008, Mozilla had long been pioneering safety on the 
Internet. The Firefox browser comes with a robust private 
browsing mode and is less susceptible to attacks than Inter-
net Explorer. The fact that both Firefox and Chromium are 
open-source also enhances their security, since it is easier for 
savvy users to discover, report, and fix problems. However, 
perhaps the chief advantage of Firefox is the large number of 
powerful add-ons that can provide additional security mea-
sures to users. Specific add-ons will be recommended below.
Finally, newer and more secure Internet browsing plat-
forms are being designed with security in mind from the 
start. While security concerns clearly dictated aspects of 
Chromium’s architecture, additional efforts are underway to 
make even more secure software. Opus Palladianum (by re-
searchers at the University of Illinois) and Microsoft’s Gazelle 
project both promise to bring a higher level of security to the 
browser, but neither is available for public trial yet.
CHoosinG tHE RiGHt sEttinGs
Once a library has deliberately chosen a browser, an appro-
priate configuration can provide a base layer of protection. 
Selecting a targeted set of user preferences helps users to 
avoid exposing their data, either to others using the same 
computer or malicious users who have gained access to their 
files. The goal is to make the browser as amnesiac as possible 
while still maintaining usability. Browsing history, download 
history, form autofill information, and most especially pass-
words should all be erased each time the browser is exited. 
Figure 1 shows an example of effective settings in Firefox 4’s 
Security menu. Both Chrome and Firefox offer private brows-
ing settings that enforce a certain level of privacy: for the most 
part, closing and reopening a private browsing window will 
clear all saved information such as logins and history. This 
is called “Incognito mode” in Chrome and “Private Browsing 
mode” in Firefox.
On public computers, appropriate browser settings are 
vital. Someone should never be able to open a browser only to 
return to the previous users’ session in a password-protected 
service or view their navigation history. While it is simple to 
choose a good configuration in a browser, maintaining those 
settings over time may be difficult as users have access to the 
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software’s menus. However, Firefox allows administrators to 
create a permanent set of preferences to which the browser 
returns each time it restarts. By locking down settings, users 
can alter preferences during their browsing session, but their 
changes will be lost when the browser is closed. Chrome has 
an extension that password-protects the preferences menu.
Finally, below the browser itself and its settings, one can 
also encourage use of HTTPS sites instead of their insecure 
alternatives, a one-by-one version of the HTTPS Everywhere 
add-on mentioned in the next section. No one should be 
signed into Twitter or Facebook with an HTTP at the begin-
ning of the URL; both services offer an “HTTPS-only” box—
Facebook’s is unchecked by default—buried in their user 
preferences. Twitter’s checkbox is under Settings > Account 
> HTTPS Only (the very last option listed) while Facebook’s 
corresponding setting is more obscured given the immensity 
of their Account menu, under Account Settings > Security > 
Secure Browsing. Because of the sensitive information avail-
able on social networking sites, as well as the possibility of 
impersonation or identity theft, these settings are increasingly 
important. Many libraries teach social networking classes; 
spending a moment to point out the importance of HTTPS-
only can be a valuable addition to lesson plans.
While there was some publicity when those social me-
dia titans introduced secure sites, many more sites provide 
HTTPS alternatives. Perhaps the best example is the unde-
rutilized Google SSL (https://encrypted.google.com), which 
sends one’s Google search terms over a secure transfer pro-
tocol. While search terms may seem innocuous, there are 
certainly numerous situations wherein a user may prefer to 
keep them private, such as researching medical or legal is-
sues. Chrome users can set Encrypted Google as the omnibar’s 
Figure 1. Strong Security Setting in Firefox 4. Note that  
“Remember passwords for sites” is unchecked.
Table 1. Extensions for Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox
google Chrome Mozilla Firefox
KB SSL Enforcer
The Chrome version of HTTPS-Everywhere, this extension forces 
traffic onto HTTPS sites if available. It is less refined than the 
Firefox add-on, sometimes redirecting the browser to broken or 
empty HTTPS sites, and also slightly more vulnerable to packet 
sniffing due to a weakness in Chrome’s APIs.
WOT
Web of Trust relies on crowdsourced feedback on sites, evaluat-
ing them on factors such as trustworthiness, vendor reliability, 
privacy, and child safety. A small circle appears next to links in 
major search engines and web interfaces, colored green for safe 
sites and orange-to-red for more questionable ones. The breadth 
of Web of Trust ensures ratings for almost all major sites.
NotScripts
An emulation of the Firefox NoScript extension, this add-on at-
tempts to overcome weaknesses in Chrome’s extensions APIs via 
HTML5 storage caching. However, it is not quite as polished as 
NoScript with more frequent bugs and a requisite password that 
hinders its usability.
AdBlock Plus for Google ChromeTM (Beta)
The (unrelated) AdBlock extension is also very good at removing 
ads and preventing pop-ups. Both extensions are among the most 
popular ones for Chrome, with millions of installations.
HTTPS-Everywhere
Arguably the most important item in this table, HTTPS-Every-
where detects what domain a user is on and, if possible, sends 
their traffic over encrypted HTTPS rather than insecure HTTP. 
The add-on works seamlessly and is perhaps the best response 
to Firesheep-style attacks available for any platform. A download 
link is present on the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s website 
(www.eff.org).
Web of Trust
Web of Trust is available for Firefox under its full name as op-
posed to the acronym WOT.
NoScript
Easily the most powerful security add-on, NoScript requires user 
approval to run any script, making almost all potential attacks 
opt-in. While a potent tool for power users, if installed on public 
computers NoScript will probably disorient the majority of pa-
trons while blocking harmless scripts on legitimate websites.
AdBlock+
While this extension is designed to eliminate obnoxious ads, it 
has the added bonus of blocking malware and preventing some 
sites (such as the music service Pandora) from stealing Facebook 
login credentials.*
* Whitson Gordon, “Block Sites from Using Your Facebook Login with AdBlock Plus,” Lifehacker, May 18, 2010, http://lifehacker.com/ 
5542041/block-sites-from-using-your-facebook-login-with-adblock-plus (accessed May 28, 2011).
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default search engine by selecting “Manage Search Engines” 
in the “Basics” Preferences menu. DuckDuckGo (https://duck 
duckgo.com) is another search engine that offers an HTTPS 
version that can be set as the default. DuckDuckGo promises 
not to track its users’ activities as an added benefit. HTTPS 
for e-mail services is even more important; Gmail has HTTPS 
on by default (see the “Always use https” radio button under 
Mail Settings > General > Browser Connection) while Yahoo! 
Mail, for instance, does not provide an analogous option.
EnHAnCinG tHE BRowsER
Besides employing appropriate settings, there are browser 
extensions or add-ons that can augment functionality be-
yond what is typically available. Extensions can range from 
the somewhat trivial—changing the color or “theme” of the 
browser—to completely transformational, very nearly con-
verting one browser into another. See Table 1 for a sample 
of useful extensions for Chrome and Firefox, both of which 
have impressive options available. All the add-ons outlined 
here are free downloads from the respective Chrome Web 
Store (https://chrome.google.com/webstore?category=ext) and 
Firefox Add-ons (https://addons.mozilla.org) listings. Analo-
gous options can be discovered for most browsers, as both 
Internet Explorer (http://www.iegallery.com) and Safari (http://
extensions.apple.com) have their own add-on galleries.
Extensions are typically developed by third parties, not 
browser developers, and have varying degrees of longevity. 
While extensions in the official directories listed above are 
vetted to some degree, there have been instances of malicious 
code exposing users to further harm rather than protecting 
them. It is always worth researching an extension before us-
ing it in the field, especially when the stakes are as high as 
they can be in matters of privacy. Reading reviews, includ-
ing the brief ones in Mozilla’s Add-ons or the Chrome Web 
Store, can alert you to potential issues that other users have 
encountered. Noting the number of downloads and currency 
of updates is an indicator of how likely the extension is to be 
maintained into the future. Lastly, testing the extension in a 
safe environment can help verify that it indeed does what it 
asserts to do. For instance, one can install HTTPS-Everywhere 
on a test workstation, then visit several high-profile websites 
where a user would want their traffic to be encrypted, e.g., 
Amazon, Gmail, Google Search, Facebook, and Yahoo! Mail. 
Does the URL begin with “https”? If not, then the extension 
is not living up to its claims.
Since extensions can significantly alter the browsing ex-
perience, it is worth contemplating how users will react and 
even performing usability tests before employing too many 
on public workstations. Updates also can break extensions 
and disorient the user upon opening the browser, as in figure 
2. Some of the best extensions will be nearly seamless, such 
as AdBlock, where it is often not evident that content is be-
ing hidden, but others will be extremely disruptive, as when 
NoScript breaks the shopping cart application of an online 
vendor. Even Web of Trust may confuse patrons who do not 
know what the green circles signify. Then there are also exten-
sions which work, but only to a limited degree. BlackSheep 
(https://www.zscaler.com/blacksheep.html), for instance, is 
meant to detect whether anyone on the same connection is 
using FireSheep. However, mere detection is not preventive 
and thus there are far more appealing alternatives.
ConClusion
No amount of secure software design and customization can 
entirely eliminate the threats that exist online. Phishing forms 
can cause users to turn over valuable information regardless 
of the security of their browsing platform. Hidden HTTPS-
only options are very much left to the user’s discretion; a user 
signed into Facebook will be on an HTTPS site only if they 
have selected the option for themselves. The best extensions 
can be circumvented, whether by innovative attackers or us-
ers who do not understand their options. Even with the stellar 
NoScript and HTTPS-Everywhere add-ons, a user can opt-in 
to malicious scripts and manually override HTTPS protection 
for particular domains. Thus educating users and library staff 
is the best way to enhance online privacy. Teaching work-
shops on the subject, or marketing particular solutions to 
known problems, is inherently valuable because it spreads 
awareness of an increasingly important issue.
Librarians must encourage users to develop approaches 
to Internet privacy that best suit their particular modes of 
browsing. All of the options listed in this article come with 
their own benefits and drawbacks; there is no panacea. If 
someone is uncomfortable moving beyond their outdated 
version of Internet Explorer, then pushing a new user inter-
face with complicated privacy options on them solves little, 
but librarians can at least be informed about the risks pres-
ent. Some users may prefer the ultimate defense of a dozen 
Figure 2. A Pop-up on a public workstation shows that some 
extensions were broken by an update and interrrupts the user’s 
browsing experience.
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extensions in a locked-down settings environment, while 
others will be content simply using a state-of-the-art browser. 
Though protecting privacy is enshrined in the American Li-
brary Association’s Code of Ethics as a fundamental tenet of 
the librarian profession, librarians can strive to inform our 
patrons about online security far more than we currently do. 
If we install Firefox or Chrome with every available security 
extension on our public computers, it will still be for naught 
when our users go into a coffee shop with a public Wi-Fi 
connection, open up Internet Explorer on their laptop, and 
log in to Facebook using unencrypted HTTP. Publicizing 
security services that your library provides as well as univer-
sally available ones can help make our users safer no matter 
where they are.
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